



The neoliberal-conservative alliance and its discursive strategies for adaptation in times of crisis: the case of the Constitutional Convention of Chile (2021-2022)

Luciano Santander Hoces

Ana Belén Mercado

Neoliberal hegemony and decline

While Latin American political systems tend to oscillate between change and stability (Roberts, 2013; Silva, 2012), contemporary Chile seemed to be not so close to this phenomenon (Luna & Altman, 2012). Prior to the series of protests that in 2019 broke its monotony, for almost 30 years it had few alterations. The Social Democrat-Christian Democrat alliance alternated governments, control of chambers and public policies with the right-wing coalition without major problems. No one else, except for some outsiders, participated in the Chilean political arena, which was applauded by the specialized literature due to the high institutionalization of the party system compared to other Latin American countries during the same period (Avendaño & Sandoval, 2016; Bargsted & Somma, 2016; Barrett, 2000; Mainwaring et.al. 2000; Ortega, 2003)

As Garretón (1993) points out, during those years Chile was part of a state that he described as "protected democracy". A process characterized by institutionally shielding the model erected during the dictatorship. This was due to the various authoritarian enclaves determined in protecting the new neoliberal system installed. Then, a central element in the process of transition to democracy was the installation of an institutional political model that would ensure and deepen the neoliberal model, as well as the unquestionability of the new narrative that would bind the social order: a neoliberal consensus.

In that context, the neoliberal system imposed during the dictatorship and intensified by the generality of political actors during the first 30 years of democracy, became not only an institutional consensus, but also a social and political one. The construction of a neoliberal hegemonic system, which covered all aspects of the social life of Chileans, was a priority for the neoliberal actors who consolidated power during the 80s and 90s in Chile. (Scully, 1995; Siavelis, 2009; Silva, 1996; Silva 2021).

This period embodied political stability through the exclusion of those manifestations contrary to the free-market policies adopted. This meant an ideological agreement of a large part of the political actors, in alliance with the main economic power groups and the repressive forces that ruled during the dictatorship. Following this line, the consensus with the free market not only had economic consequences in Chilean society, but also in socio-cultural aspects. Throughout this period, a constant phenomenon was evident: the increasingly strong and notorious detachment between the Chilean society and the political system. Without having institutional referents (neither parties nor unions) that could counterbalance the neoliberal consensus of the main political actors, the hegemonic power of the free market was also reflected in social behavior (Roberts, 2012; Silva, 2009).

However, this sense of “normality” of the neoliberal hegemony was going alongside with a parallel social phenomenon. A counter-hegemonic struggle begins to consolidate in Chile, with an emergence of social movements with grass root bases backing (Garreton et.al., 2018; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Silva, 2012; Roberts, 2012). This is accompanied by an important electoral reform (2017) that allowed the emergence/reincorporation of new political parties. The appearance of the Frente Amplio and the reincorporation of the Communist Party in Chilean politics meant the creation of a left-wing bench in 2017 (from 2 to 22 representatives in the Congress in one election). In fact, during these years, Chilean society witnessed an unprecedented process of re-politicization. If fifteen years ago 61% considered that changes "need time", by 2015 61% asked for "acting fast because changes cannot wait" (PNUD, 2015). Issues such as profit in education, inequality, the Constitution, and the privatization of social rights, were placed in the public debate, but still without being taken up by the actors of the neoliberal consensus.

In that context, in October 2019, following the announcement by Sebastián Piñera's government to raise the subway fare in Santiago, millions of people spontaneously came out to protest throughout the national territory during internal days of protests for weeks. The above, without any formal leadership and bringing together many social demands that for years were neglected by the political class. The Social Outburst came to radically change the Chilean social consensus, as well as the political system itself.

There is certainly no unanimity on whether the Social Outburst was a widespread representation of protests of an anti-neoliberal nature or not. There are authors who attribute it more to an endemic political crisis. For example, there are theses that classify it as a challenge coming from historically marginalized sectors, against the socially disconnected role of the political and economic elites of the transition, or the so-called “30 years”, as well as a claim from traditionally marginalized to be part of decision-making (Bellolio, 2022a; Bellolio 2022b). In these theses, the context is understood as a crisis of social disconnection transversal to the elite system, where the affected structure of participation and politicization of Chilean society saw in the protests a space to have a voice.

Other authors refer to the fact that the essential component of the protest has to do with disaffection with the neoliberal model, especially in how the sustained growth of Chile and the

benefits that this could have brought in past years, were no longer perceived by new generations (COES, 2020; Ruiz, 2020; Ruiz & Caviedes, 2022). An anger fed by inequality and lack of opportunities in a model based on meritocracy promises, would have been the fundamental point for the cycle of protests.

From our point of view, the individual reasons and motivations of the people who protested can be multivariate. From a sociological point of view, pigeonholing the motivation of millions without organic representation, within the framework of the same voice, could be a mistake. Beyond the motivations of the protest itself, what can be assumed is that it represented a moment of contestation of the neoliberal model, where its hegemony was threatened. The consequences that the feeling of rage that was expressed in the streets had on the vision of the hegemonic project of neoliberal actors, and consequently, on challenging the neoliberal consensus.

Cracks in the neoliberal hegemony and far-right backlash

Slogans such as "Neoliberalism born and dies in Chile", "Chile will be the tomb of neoliberalism" were common both during the demonstrations and during the speeches of political leaders in the mobilizations. Even the current president Gabriel Boric alluded to them during campaign speeches and debates. In terms of discourse, the rupture of the neoliberal consensus transformed the political agenda and Chilean society, as discussions on reforms focused on the recovery and strengthening of previously ignored social rights began to be part of the national discussion. Gradually, the elite begins to face an organic crisis led by anti-neoliberal slogans, and a new process of democratization presents itself by questioning the model and breaking the agreement with the free market. And more importantly, by the opening of a discussion which would endanger the main protective body of the neoliberal consensus: the 1980 Constitution drawn up during a dictatorship.

Following the previous conceptual line, the neoliberal implementation in Chile was accompanied by a complex institutionality that allowed the protection of this model in the country, being the Constitution of 1980, erected fraudulently by the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, and valid to this day. The Chilean Constitution defines the State as a subsidiary, keeping it outside the role of wealth redistribution, ensuring the power of the elites and establishing different regulations that keep any substantial change to the model from public control (Siabelis, 2009; Silva, 1996; Martínez Mateo, 2020; Turner, 2008). On the other hand, the successful process of depoliticizing Chilean society contributes to the institutional disconnect between social accountability and democratic control of the central axes of neoliberalism (Araujo, 2016; Muñoz, 2007), where even in moments of organic crisis of the regime, as occurred with the Social Outburst, there is an unrestricted and efficient defense of the model (Muñoz, 2007; Moncada, 2018; Pérez Godoy & Valencia Narbona, 2021).

On November 15, less than a month after the mobilizations occurred, almost all the political parties, including those that could be called neoliberal actors, signed what was known as the "Agreement for Peace" (Acuerdo por la Paz in Spanish). With this - considered an institutional solution to the crisis caused by the Social Outburst - the political class opened itself to the possibility of carrying out a referendum that would ask the population if they wanted a new Constitution or not. The result was overwhelming, with 78.28% approving the motion. This gave rise to the creation of a Constitutional Convention in charge of drafting a new constitution that would then be put to a plebiscite.

From a Gramscian perspective, the organic crises of the regime are constituted when large social groups separate from the representation of their parties. It is what Gramsci (1999) calls the

opposition between representatives and represented, generally reflected in the entire state apparatus. This crisis of hegemony of the ruling class occurs when vast social groups suddenly pass from political passivity to active and organized demands. Thus, a crisis of hegemony of the State as a whole is constituted (Gramsci, 1999: 52). And this is precisely what happened in Chile, an organic crisis of the social and cultural hegemony of neoliberalism, because of the impact on certain social groups of the sustained increase in access barriers and costs to basic social rights such as education, health, and public services such as transportation and food, due to privatization, deregulation, and elimination of subsidies (Silva, 2012). However, these moments of crisis leave an open field for different solutions. Gramsci mentions that the organic crises of hegemony are solved either through radical transformations promoted by the working class, or by forceful and authoritarian solutions that seek to protect and/or restructure the power of the ruling classes. In this line, the organic crisis that the actors defending the model began to suffer, as well as the crisis of ideological hegemony of the neoliberal consensus, would mean the reorganization of these actors as an opposition axis to the demands of the Social Outburst.

This answer is not through amorphous or hidden actors acting under the method of an invisible hand seeking to maintain an order, but specific people and institutions mobilized to defend neoliberal hegemony. There is a relationship between social forces, rather than an amorphous reaction to neoliberalism as a system; this crisis of the neoliberal consensus then led to the rapid consolidation of the new far-right party in Chile, the Republican Party, surpassing the historical right-wing parties' heirs of the dictatorship

The growth of the far right is often linked to both ideological and pragmatic considerations: a mixture between the perceived "loss" of culture with economic deprivations (Salyga, 2022), along with the feeling of confrontation against the sometimes called "political elites". As we will argue below, the two institutional response outcomes of the Social Outburst (the election of Boric and the Constituent Convention) failed to provide a response to the economic deprivations inherited after years of neoliberalism in Chile and the growing inflation of recent years. The same with the growing sense of loss of national identity, fueled both by the actions of the representatives of the Convention and the agenda imposed by the media power. Following Polanyi's Double Movement theory, the radicalization of right-wing positions, which brought about programmatic and discursive changes, functions in this case as a counter-movement phenomenon to the changes demanded by Chilean society, which were condensed in the Social Outburst. Therefore, we postulate that the emergence of the far-right, both their institutional representations as well as to its ideational discursive stance in the process of hegemonic positioning, functions under the logic of reaction to the crisis of hegemony of Chilean neoliberalism, and therefore, through a natural and inevitable alliance between the old neoliberal forces and the new far-right forces.

The institutional response to the Social Outburst: The Constitutional Convention

Faced with a scenario of overflowing protests and delegitimization of the elites to manage the crisis, the right and neoliberal actors had no alternative but to agree on an institutional solution. Not only was the government being questioned, but big businessmen also took a dim view of the economic losses caused by the paralysis of economic life. Therefore, the entry plebiscite was held on October 25, 2020, with the aim of submitting the approval or rejection of the reform of the Constitution to popular consultation. Once this instance was approved, a second election was held in May 2021 to elect the 155 representatives of the Convention. The results of this election caused surprise, since the right did not manage to reach the third of conventional members, necessary to have veto power. The novelty was provided by the independent lists, which achieved 37 seats together. These lists

represented the contrary spirit to the logic of neoliberal commercialization that prevailed during neoliberal consensus. Their various demands pointed to different social problems: the social-environmental issue, feminism, and education. Once the debates and work in the commissions of the Constituent Convention began, part of the conservative neoliberal alliance was evident. The traditional defenders of the Pinochet Constitution of 1980 were joined by the liberal right in the militancy for the "Rejection" (Ruiz and Caviedes, 2022).

Finally, the process was blurred, and, with a high level of electoral participation, this was the option that triumphed in the exit plebiscite of September 2022. The constituent process would continue, this time promoted by an Expert Commission in charge of drafting a new project of the Constitution, marked by right-wing groups, which would also be rejected towards the end of 2023.

We then define neoliberal lobby groups and ultra-conservative groups as currents of thought that refuse to expand social rights at a universal level. What Escoffier and Vivaldi describe as "anti-rights" deny the evolution of certain rights, through a mobilization based on the intrinsic denial that social groups can access certain rights (Escoffier & Vivaldi, 2023a).

Alliance and adaptation strategies: discursive analysis of the Convention and far-right leaders

The Social Outburst brought with it the political emergence of José Antonio Kast, leader of the far-right Republican Party. Critical of the ideological abandonment of the traditional right-wing parties, he emphasized the importance of radicalizing positions in a new scenario where progressive parties are applying an agenda contrary to conservative and neoliberal values, especially after the protests.

The series of defeats of the moral-conservative agenda, the constant programmatic moderation of the right and the openness to discussions on issues related to the redistribution of wealth, meant a redirection of the strategy of the actors defending the Chilean status quo. One of the measures adopted by the neoliberal actor is what Escoffier & Vivaldi defines as "moral panic strategy" (2023b). According to the authors, this represents an attempt to create a sense of fear in society, arguing that conservative values are under attack, with the intention of creating support in religious, conservative, and far-right groups (Escoffier & Vivaldi, 2023b: 157). The above was present from the beginning of the operation of the Constituent Convention, intensifying as the debate went on. This meant a strategy to reorient social perception regarding moral values and the role of the State to reduce inequality gaps and distribute resources. That is, an agenda contrary to the main demands raised during the Social Outburst.

Discourse analysis and reconstruction of trajectories during the Social Outburst and the Constituent Convention

In the period that opened with the Social Outburst and the development of the Constitutional Convention, it is observed how the rights adopted varied discourses, although the core of their ideas remained constant.

During the interviews we conducted in the field, it is shown that there is constantly an allusion to the need to defend the system but emphasizing the importance of meritocracy. This, for example, sounds very strong in three of the interviewees from the Republican Party, who have origins in popular sectors of the country: "We could, no one helped us. And here we are because the system allowed us to emerge (...) we don't want help from the State, we don't want other freerides to

receive help, we are the example of the American Dream.” And for the same reason, they advocate defending this system in a more radical way.

On the other hand, an accelerated radicalization is observed from the Chile Vamos sector and neoliberal actors, who at the time agreed with carrying out a constituent process. The above is explained by the radicalization carried out by the Republican Party and its successful conservative discursive strategy. Two central elements that emerged in the interview when talking about the constituent process are, on the one hand, the defense of the values of the 1980 Constitution (free market and private property) and, on the other, the defense of national values that were being affected by the radical left. This last point is understood as a feeling of moral panic when considering that the “Chilean identity” and “Christian identity” were in danger; this would be part of a conservative reaction to some of the topics that were discussed at the Convention. Such as, for example, the legalization of abortion.

This strategy of moral panic is exemplified in the victory speech of the command of the rejection of the new Constitution, led by José Antonio Kast, in three moments emphasis is placed on the symbolism built around the proposal, the ideological representation of the new constitution destined to the refoundation of Chile and its cultural values. This can also be identified in those codes that were affected at the level of public opinion, such as patriotic symbols:

“After a deep process of moral, institutional, and social disintegration that we have lived through in the last three years, we do not want any more stain on our flag, we do not want any more offenses to our families, to our children. By some people who feel that they abhor what is our tradition, our culture.” (Kast, 2022: 00:02:41 - 00:03:11)

“And that is where we must go out to defend our homeland, our values, to rebuild what has been destroyed and what has been lost in these years. After these two years we must go out to recover Chile and to start working hard to build again a free and safe country for all, with a government, with this government that goes out to protect all Chileans, with the actions and clear decisions that we have not seen so far.” (Kast, 2022: 00:09:14 - 00:09:47).

In the reconstructed scenario we locate the performance of the think tank Libertad y Desarrollo (LyD) as an empirical reference for the actions of neoliberal actors, among others, the survey of their strategies is necessary to be able to study the connection between far-right and neoliberalism, as an ideological alliance. The previous, as representation of capitalism's ability to adapt in times of crisis.

For decades, Chile has been known for its institutionalized think tanks, which are incorporated into the political life of the country. A considerable number of these centers appeared between the late 1970s and early 1980s, in the context marked by the military dictatorship, and served as a refuge for those who worked in social science research spaces and whose profile was democratic-progressive (Gárate, 2008). With the recovery of democracy, these think tanks were part of the first Concertación governments. In a parallel process, since the 1980s and early 1990s, think tanks of a conservative or right-wing nature emerged, which serve as refuges for those who had participated in the recently dethroned military regime. Likewise, they focus on the production and dissemination of ideas that sought to direct new state policies, in correspondence with the proximity of their members to the country's large business groups.

It is within this framework that LyD appeared in 1990, as an initiative of three recognized figures of the pro-market reforms that changed the structure of the country during the military dictatorship and being part of the second generation of the Chicago Boys: Hernán Büchi, Cristián Larroulet and

Carlos Cáceres (Corbalán Pössel and Corbalán Cabrera, 2012, pp. 195-196). LyD was established as independent of any political, religious, business, and governmental group, whose main tasks were to draw up diagnoses and propose public policies. That is, it was born as an intellectual project in the transition from the military to the democratic regime, given the need to support Chile's development ideas through neoliberal means. In this way, it gave legitimacy to the continuity of many of the government policies implemented during the dictatorship. Already in the 21st century, the connection between LyD experts and the right was crystallized in the cabinet of Sebastián Piñera in 2010, when five of the seventeen state ministers summoned by the then president had been members of the think tank (Corbalán Pössel and Corbalán Cabrera, 2012).

In recent years, LyD appeared at the top of the annual ranking of think tanks prepared by the University of Pennsylvania, where it is among the 30 most prominent think tanks in Latin America and the Caribbean. This accounts for LyD's transnational presence, although its activities are oriented towards local policy issues.

In the map of Chilean think tanks, this center is grouped together with conservative ones, usually related to the political right, free market economics, conservative values, and the defense of the interests of large economic groups and companies. This group also includes other think tanks such as the Center for Public Studies (CEP), the Libertad Institute, the Jaime Guzmán Foundation, the Paz Ciudadana Foundation, and the Futuro Foundation (Gárate, 2008).

One of the features that characterize these think tanks is their ability to work with their own thematic agendas, whose extension is medium or long term. This provides them with continuity in their ideas and meanings and at the same time contrasts with the logic of politics, which adjusts to the always volatile situations of electoral rhythms and the search for results through the implementation of public policies (Pinilla, 2012). In this sense, we understand that the Constitutional Convention was a favorable scenario to articulate long-term agendas with the immediate situation and the debates that arose.

The role of LyD in the constitutional process between 2020 and 2022

The strategy adopted by LyD during the constitutional process between 2020 and 2022 was mutating from the initial rejection of the demand for reform to active participation in the Convention and, finally, the integration of three of its members to the Expert Commission, in charge of drafting a new Constitution after the first rejection.

Since the Social Outburst, LyD established its position by focusing on the disruption of public order and the violence, rather than the demands of the protest. They also proposed that the pact to end the crisis include limits on social protest, since they considered that in this way, they sought to destroy capitalism, private property and representative democracy (Dávila, 2020).

The way in which think tanks like LyD produce and organize their meanings around the crisis due to the Social Outburst, is explained from their positions on the State: its perception, its role in society and its scope. This set of ideas is presented as continuity over time and regularity. The yardstick by which the State's interference in certain matters is measured is identified by LyD experts in terms of "populism" (Dávila, 2020). However, the direction of the social crisis was not highly valued by LyD, although this did not mean that they accepted popular demands. Rather, the experts considered that the crisis was not of the system, but rather a crisis of management or efficiency in the administration of resources. Once the imminence of the Constitutional Convention was assumed, LyD experts dedicated themselves to the production of activities and events related to the different topics that were going through it.

This is a common strategy that think tanks resort to when installing topics on the opinion agenda. In this case, LyD organized a series of talks and several cycles of meetings where they discussed what was at stake in the constitutional process. Several of these initiatives were carried out together with other right-wing think tanks, such as the Jaime Guzmán Foundation. There, topics were raised around different axes such as the Social Outburst, the role of the right in the new political cycle, the role and modernization of the State, the government regime, social and economic rights, and decentralization.

In addition, between 2020 and 2021 they carried out a diploma course in “Institutional Information” that had two cohorts of 40 enrolled each, where communication, negotiation and argumentation tools were provided for constitutional discussion. A document was also drafted with proposals for the regulations of the Convention aimed at the conventional constituents of Chile Vamos, prepared in conjunction with eleven other think tanks. LyD's strategy to wage the “cultural battle” within the framework of the Convention was not limited to carrying out activities aimed at experts, conventional or referents in the field of politics, but was also oriented towards the public. Based on this objective, LyD published more than ninety opinion articles in different print media. In addition, they published the “Constituent News”, and produced eighteen thematic videos, eleven podcasts and a considerable number of videos that had several thousand views on YouTube. During the week prior to the plebiscite, they sought to bring the voices of think tank researchers closer by broadcasting short videos in reel format, with the purpose of accentuating the campaign to reject the constitutional text.

Conclusions: sensation of “moral panic” as a hegemonic defense strategy

The synthesis of the constituent process can be divided in two: on the one hand, there is the constitutional text, the real, the objective and the written, which, despite several shortcomings (such as its long quantitative and qualitative extension), tried to respond to most of the anti-neoliberal demands raised during the mobilizations. On the other hand, the symbolic, semiotic, communicational, media and ideological representation of both the text and the work of the Convention, whose image is built on the preponderance of value-identity discussions that not only did not interest those who sympathized with the protests, but, at the same time attracted negative attention. This differentiation is important because it succeeded in installing the idea that the constitution being proposed to the country was alien both to the demands of the Social Outburst and to the identity values of Chilean society; a symbolic representation based on a differential policy of values.

This led to a mutation in the image of the Convention members, because for the public opinion, they ended up becoming what the Social Outburst claimed against: a political elite that discusses issues disconnected from the national reality. In this way, the representational dispute of the constitutional text was won, and, therefore, an ideological battle.

They succeeded in building a new binding narrative based on the defense of values, confronting the progressive agenda that supposedly wanted to radically transform Chile's traditional morals, to the point that the discussion on the neoliberal model took a back seat in the campaign of Approving or Rejecting the new constitution.

References

- Alenda, S., Le Foulon, C., & Suárez-Cao, J. (2023). Chile: Orthodoxy and heterodoxy on the right. In *The Right in the Americas* (pp. 190–216). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003352266-13>
- Avendaño, O. y Sandoval, P. 2016. "Desafección política y estabilidad de los resultados electorales en Chile, 1993–2009". *Perfiles Latinoamericanos* 24 (47).
- Bargsted, M. y Somma, N. 2016. "Social cleavages and political dealignment in contemporary Chile, 1995–2009". *Party Politics* 22(1).
- Barrett, P. 2000. "Chile's transformed party system and the future of democratic stability". *Journal of International Studies and World affairs* 42 (3): 1 – 32.
- Bellolio, C. (2020). Populismo como democracia iliberal: Una hipótesis sobre el estallido social chileno. *Revista de Sociología*, 35(1), 43–55. <https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-529X.2020.58106>
- Bellolio C. (2022). Sin agonismo no hay paraíso: Polarización y populismo en el proceso constituyente chileno. *Revista Stultifera*, 5(2), 217–240. <https://doi.org/10.4206/rev.stultifera.2022.v5n2-09>
- Bruff, I. (2013). The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism. *Rethinking Marxism*, 26:1, 113-129.
- Bruff, I. & Burak, C. (2019). Authoritarian neoliberalism trajectories of knowledge production and praxis. *Globalizations*, 16:3, 233-244
- Casas, L., & Vivaldi, L. (2014). Abortion in Chile: the practice under a restrictive regime. *Reproductive Health Matters*, 22(44), 70–81. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0968-8080\(14\)44811-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0968-8080(14)44811-0)
- Castiglioni, R. 2005. *The Politics of Social Policy Change in Chile and Uruguay: Retrenchment versus Maintenance, 1973-1998*. New York: Routledge. Cap. 2; 5.
- Chamayou, G. 2018. "La sociedad ingobernable. Una genealogía del liberalismo autoritario". Mayenne, Francia, La Fabrique éditions.
- Chau, M. (2020). O totalitarismo neoliberal. *Anacronismo e irrupción*, 10(18), Article 18.
- COES [Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies] (2020), 'Observatory of Conflicts – Cumulative Dataset', Harvard Dataverse, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GKQXBR>
- Dávila, M. (2020). Los think tanks de la derecha en tiempos de crisis. Barómetro de Política y Equidad. *Chile en cuarentena: Causas y efectos de la crisis política y social*, 17, 45-68.
- Escoffier, S., & Vivaldi, L. (2023a). Introduction: The Right against Rights in Latin America. In S. Escoffier, L. A. Payne, & J. Zulver (Eds.), *The Right against Rights in Latin America* (pp. 1–28). British Academy. <https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197267394.003.0001>
- Escoffier, S., & Vivaldi, L. (2023b). Why Anti-Abortion Movements Fail: The Case of Chile. In *The Right against Rights in Latin America* (pp. 141–161). British Academy. <https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197267394.003.0008>

Gárate, M. (2008). Think Tanks y Centros de Estudio. Los nuevos mecanismos de influencia política en el Chile post-autoritario. *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos. Nouveaux mondes mondes nouveaux - Novo Mundo Mundos Novos - New world New worlds*. <https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.11152>

Garretón, M. 1993. *La Redemocratización Política en Chile: transición, inauguración y evolución*. Santiago, Chile: FLACSO.

Garretón, M., A. Joignat, N. Somma, and T. Campos (2018), Informe anual observatorio de conflictos 2018, Notas COES de política pública, 17 (Santiago de Chile, Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesión Social).

Gramsci, A. (1999). *Cuadernos de la cárcel* (1st ed., Vol. 1). Ediciones Era.

Grugel, J. & Riggirozzi, P. 2012. Post-neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding and Reclaiming the State after Crisis. *Development and Change* 43(1): 1–21.

Grugel, J. & Riggirozzi, P. 2018. Neoliberal disruption and neoliberals's afterlife in Latin America: What is left of post-neoliberalism. *Critical Social Policy* 2018, Vol. 38(3): 547–566

Harvey, D. 2007. Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 610, NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development, pp.22-44

Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos (INDH). 2020. INDH entrega Balance a un año de la crisis social: <https://www.indh.cl/indh-entrega-balance-a-un-ano-de-la-crisis-social/>

Kast, C. 2019. Neoliberales en América Latina. En *Neoliberalismo, neodesarrollismo y socialismo bolivariano* (1.ª ed., pp. 55–103). Grupos de Trabajo de CLACSO. Santiago de Chile.

Levitsky, S. and K. M. Roberts (2011), *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press).

Luna, J. & Altman, D. 2012. Uprooted but Stable: Chilean Parties and the Concept of Party System Institutionalization. *Latin American Politics and Society* 53 (2), pp. 1-28

Martinez Mateo, M. (2020). Life-protecting neoliberalism: Hayek and the biopolitics of abortion in Chile. *Economy and Society*, 49(4), 596–618. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2020.1789366>

Mainwaring, S. Montes, J. & Ortega, E. 2000. "Rethinking the Chilean Party System". *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, 795--824.

Moncada, B. (2018). Autoritarismo y participación: el pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán. *Anuario Filosófico*, 473–486. <https://doi.org/10.15581/009.36.29421>

Mudde, C. 2019. *The far right today*. Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA : Polity.

Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. 2013. Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America. *Government and opposition* (London), 2013, Vol.48 (2), p.147-174

Ortega, E. 2003. "Los partidos políticos chilenos: Cambio y estabilidad en el comportamiento electoral 1990--2000. *Revista de Ciencia Política* 23 (2): 109--147.

- Pérez Godoy, F., & Valencia Narbona, L. (2021). El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán en la formación cívica de los chilenos en dictadura. *Cuadernos de Historia (Santiago)*, 54, 119–145. <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0719-12432021000100119>
- Pinilla, J. P. (2012). Think Tanks, saber experto y formación de agenda política en el Chile actual. *Polis, Revista de la Universidad Bolivariana*, 11(32), 119-140.
- Polanyi, K. (1957). *The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time*. Boston, Mass, US: Beacon paperback ed.
- Roberts, K. 2012. "Market Reform, Programmatic (De)alignment, and Party System Stability in Latin America". *Comparative Political Studies*, N°46: 1422-1452.
- Rovira Kaltwasser C., Taggart, P., Ochoa, P. & Ostiguy, P. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*: Oxford: Oxford University Press-
- Ruiz, C. (2020). *Octubre chileno. La irrupción de un nuevo pueblo*. Taurus.
- Ruiz C., & Caviedes, S. (2022). *El poder constituyente de la revuelta chilena*. CLASCO.
- Scully, T. 1995. "Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile". En *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, editado por Scott Mainwaring y Timothy Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 100--137.
- Siavelis, P. 1999. "Continuidad y Transformación del Sistema de Partidos en una Transición Modelo". En *El modelo chileno. Democracia y desarrollo en los noventa*, editado por Paul Drake e Iván Jaksic, Iván. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 223--259.
- Silva, E. 1996. *The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics*. Boulder: Westview. Introducción Capítulos: 7 y 8
- Silva, E. 2009. *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America*. Nueva York, Estados Unidos: Cambridge University Press.
- Silva, E. (2012). Exchange Rising? Karl Polanyi and Contentious Politics in Contemporary Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Fall 2012), pp. 1-32
- Silva, P. 2021. *In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in Chile*. University Park, PA : Penn State University Press.
- Stefanoni, P. (2021) ¿La rebeldía se volvió de derecha? Cómo el antiprogresismo y la anticorrección política están construyendo un nuevo sentido común (y por qué la izquierda debería tomarlos en serio). Siglo XXI.
- Turner, R. S. (2008). Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism: Ideology, Government and the Rule of Law. *Journal of Politics and Law*, 1(2). <https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v1n2p47>
- Vivaldi, L. (2019). *Autonomy, Vulnerability, and Resistance*. In *Citizenship and Disadvantaged Groups in Chile*. Lexington Books.